Beyond Bagehot -- towards 2000 | Republican Movement of Aotearoa New Zealand

Beyond Bagehot - towards 2000

Political analyst Tomas Kriha describes the monarchy as the "theatrical element" of New Zealand's constitution. But to continue regarding the head of state as a powerless, purely ceremonial, and impartial figurehead is a dangerous fiction. New Zealanders deserve a constitution that appeals to their understanding.

By Tomas Kriha

"To state the matter shortly, royalty is a government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions. A republic is a government in which that attention is divided between many, who are all doing uninteresting actions. Accordingly, so long as the human heart is strong and human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffused feeling, and republics weak because they appeal to the understanding."

--Walter Bagehot (1867): The English Constitution.

Bagehot, editor of The Economist from 1860 to 1877, held that the English Constitution effectively separated two distinct parts of the political system: "first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population-the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and next, the efficient parts -- those by which it, in fact, works and rules." Bagehot regarded the monarchy as the most important "theatrical element" of the constitution. As such, it served to entertain the "crowds of people scarcely more civilised than the majority of two thousand years ago" and divert the attention of the masses from the operation of the efficient parts. Over a century has passed since the publication of The English Constitution.

The Economist (22-28 October 1994) now openly opposes the influence of Bagehot's political philosophy given the strength of "other traditions which run through history as consistently as those of monarchy, and far more"; traditions represented by British political thinkers such as Locke, Hume, Paine, Godwin, and Mill who did "more than those of any other nation to help create the modern idea of democracy". The Economist concluded that "it is hard to believe that monarchy is vital for the political health of such a nation." Bagehot's undisguised denial of individual liberty and responsibility exposes the essence of a monarchist political philosophy -- a philosophy which must necessarily defend hereditary privilege and disenfranchisement of much of the population. Such notions can only be abhorrent to contemporary New Zealand society.

New Zealanders deserve a constitution that appeals to their understanding -- a constitution commanding popular legitimacy by virtue of its stable and efficient operation in New Zealand's unique socio-political environment. To achieve this, we must anticipate the coming stresses which MMP will place on our present constitution. The latent dangers inherent in an unwritten constitution granting sweeping yet vague reserve powers to the head of state will become patent when combined with a more fluid and volatile Parliamentary environment. Mixing a fluid and volatile Parliamentary environment with an unwritten constitution granting sweeping yet vague reserve powers to the head of state will make a volatile constitutional cocktail.

Recall for a moment, just a few reserve powers currently held by the head of state. The head of state may summon, prorogue, and dissolve Parliament. The head of state may also control the process of government formation and dissolution; the head of state may invite a Member of Parliament to form a government, dismiss the Prime Minister, and request the resignation of a Minister who has lost the confidence of the house. There are few, and often contradictory, conventions guiding the exercise of these powers, each of which acquires a new importance under MMP. In constitutional lawyer Mai Chen's opinion: "There will be more opportunities for the Governor-General to exercise control over coalition and minority governments [and] the Governor-General will become a more active guardian of the constitution." To continue regarding the head of state as a powerless, purely ceremonial, and impartial figurehead is a dangerous fiction.

At best, such a view would disguise the actual decision-making process and distort the constitutional balance of power, much as Bagehot had hoped. At worst, it may exacerbate future constitutional crises by placing in the midst of the political landscape an unexploded mine of uncertain location, strength, or fuse. This mine may be defused by discarding Bagehot's notions and instead rationalising the constitution: replace the mystique surrounding the head of state with clearly defined powers and precise guidelines for their exercise.

Further, the head of state must be responsive and accountable to the electorate: this can only be achieved by direct or indirect election of the head of state. As republicans, we look beyond Bagehot, towards the new millennium dawning on a republican New Zealand -- a new commonwealth founded on a democratic spirit, legitimate constitution, and independent identity. Let these be the founding principles of the new commonwealth: democracy, constitution, and identity.