“The generals are always prepared to fight the last war” as the saying goes, and the same applies to the head of state debate. We often hear claims, most of them well-meaning or just ill-informed, that the British monarch has a lot of potential constitutional power to keep our politicians in check, yet whenever this claim is challenged, no-one is able to provide any concrete examples of how this is true. In fact, the monarch does not provide any check or balance, and the belief that they do is both outdated and dangerous. The recent anniversary on March 2nd of the 1986 Australia Acts and our own Constitution Act passed in the same year, underlines this fact.

Prior to the passing of the 1986 Act, the potential powers of the monarch (and Governor-General) were much wider. For example, under the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, the monarch and Governor had the specific ability to refuse to grant Royal assent to legislation (section 56). This power, although falling out of use after the colonial period of our history, was still on the books when repealed. The 1986 Act greatly reduced the ability of the monarch or Governor-General to refuse assent to legislation, recognising the fact the power had rarely been used.

Yet we still hear arguments for keeping the monarchy as if these powers still exist. This is an important point for both sides of the head of state debate: the constitutional reality is that the monarch has next to no constitutional powers with respect to New Zealand. The monarch’s only real function now is to rubber-stamp the Prime Minister’s choice of Governor-General, the office that fulfils all the constitutional work of the head of state. From 1 January 1987, when our Constitution Act came into force, Britain no longer had the ability to legislate for us, even at our request.

Arguments for the monarchy based on a more powerful monarch are therefore simply the generals fighting the last war.